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ATTITUDES TOWARDS RISK: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF A.~ EXPERIMENT IN RURAL INDIA*
An earlier paper (Binswanger , 1978a) described an experiment carried

out with around 320 people in rural India to measure their pure attitudes towards
risk.

It also measured correlation s between individual characteris tics such as

wealth, age, etc., and the measured risk attitudes.

This paper confronts one

basic set of results from these experiments with various theories of behavior
under uncertainty to check their empirical relevance for the rural households
studied, who belong to the poorest of the world.

The theories have been

developed by statistician s, economists and mathematica l psychologis ts.
The experiment makes practically no theoretical restriction s; individuals choose among alternative s where increasing expected returns can only be
purchased by increasing risk or dispersion of outcomes, and the alternative s
would be ranked more or less risky almost regardless of which definition of
risk is used.

The reason for wanting to make a commitment to a specific theory

is that only with such a commitment can the experimenta l results be used to
make predictions of behavior in different risky situations such as the individu
al's farming decisions.

The weaker the theoretical restriction s, the weaker

the predictions which can be made.

Without a theory, it is as if the human

mind was perfectly divided into different compartmen ts, with observed behavior
in one compartment no~ allowing us to make predictions of how decisions would
be made in another compartment .
The first section briefly recalls the key experimenta l results.
*Hans P. Binswanger is an Associate of the Agricultura l Development Council presently
stationed at the Economic Growth Center of Yale University. The experiment on which
this paper is based was carried out while the author was stationed at the Internation al
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, Hyderabad, India, and with its
generous support. I would like to thank B. C. Barah, R. D. Ghodake, S. S. Badhe,
M. J. Bhende, V. Bhaskar Rao, T. Balaramaiah , N. B. Dudhane, Rekha Gaiki, K. G.
Kshirgar, Madhu Nath and Usha Rani, who helped in carrying out the experiment.
Harvey Lapan made particularl y helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Section II considers safety-based rules of thumb and finds that only
one of them is not

inconsistent with the data.

(It is not inconsistent

because it offers~ prediction of how people faced with the experiment
should behave).

Section III is a broad overview of utility based theories

used by economists and psychologists, and the empirical evidence is used
to show that only some of these models are consistent with the observed
behavior.

Section IV then tests and rejects the hypothesis of asset

integration, i.e., it finds that one cannot write a stable utility
function across wealth states but only across gains and losses,with the zero
point of that function shifting as wealth changes.

Section V proposes

a functional form for the utility function which is consistent with the
experimental evidence and a final section tries to pull the threads to
gether.
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THE KEY EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
The expe rime nt--c arrie d out with over 300 indiv
idua ls selec ted at
random from six villa ges of the semi -arid trac
ts of Maha rasht ra and Andh ra
Prad esh- -con siste d of a sequ ence of games with
real and high payo ffs of the
follo wing natu re: Peop le were offe red a set
of 8 choic e alter nativ es in
whic h high er expe cted retu rn could only be "pur
chas ed" for a larg er
stand ard devi ation . The alter nativ es A to Fare
desc ribed in the top
pane l of Tabl e 1. Each cons ists of a "good luck
" and a ''bad luck " outco me
with prob abili ty of 1/2 whic h is decid ed on
a toss of a coin . Alte rnati ve
zero is a cert ain outco me in whic h the indiv
idua l is simp ly paid Rs 50
wher eas alter nati ve F pays noth ing or Rs 200
with equa l prob abili ty. The
alter nati ves D* and Dare stoc hast icall y domi
nated by alter nativ es B, C
and E resp ectiv ely. Each alter nati ve is give
n a name clas sifyi ng the
exte nt of risk aver sion of the perso n who choo
ses it. These names are
arbi trary and more prec ise meas urem ents of risk
aver sion are discu ssed
below .
The game was play ed--a nd actu ally paye d--7 or
8 time s over a
perio d of abou t 6 weeks with much time left
for refle ctio n. The
game sequ ence star ts with 5 games at the 0.50
Rs leve l, in whic h all
amou nts in Tabl e 1 were divid ed by 100. The
payo ffs are then incre ased
to the 5 Rs leve l at whic h all amou nts of Tabl
e 1 are divid ed by 10.
Afte r two week s, the game is playe d at the leve
l shown and hypo theti cal
ques tions are aske d of each part icipa nt how
he woul d play at the 500 Rs
leve l, in whic h all amou nts of Tabl e 1 are mult
iplie d by 10. Note that
mont hly wage s of unsk illed labo rers in this
area are roug hly 60 to 80 Rs.
The amou nts were there fore larg e for these peop
le. For a deta iled des-

!.Effects of Payoff Size on Distribution of Risk Aversion
and on the Partial, Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion Coefficients.

Extreme

Severe

Inter

Moderate

mediate
A

0

B

1)

Slight-to- Neutral-to -Inefficient
Neutral
Preferred

C

E

F

D*

D

THC ALTERNATIVES AT TIIE 5 RS LEVEL

Bad Luck (50%)

50

45

40

30

10

0

35

20

Good Luck (50%)

50

95

120

150

190

200

125

160

LEVEL

GAME

2)

N.OBS

FREQUENCIES OF CHOICES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS

0.50 Rs (No. 2)

1. 7

5.9

28.5

20.2

15.1

18.5

10.1

119

5 Rs (No. 7)

0.9

8.5

25.6

36 .8

12.0

8.5

7.7

117

50 Rs (No. 12)

2.5

5.1

34.8

39 .8

6.8

1.7

9.3

118

500 Rs (No. 16)
(no payment)

2.5

13.6

51.7

28.8

0

0.9

2.5

118

3)
.90

TRADEOFF BETWEEN E AND SE:

• 735

.585

3.61

1.20
5)

0

.so

Rs

5.17

~10. 7
> 1.07

5 Rs

a

50 Rs

~o

PARTIAL RISK AVERSION Sa

4)
All levels

z "' tiE/tiSEa

.165

.415

ABSOLUTE RISK AVERSION

1. 71

~o

.158

.51

A

. 728

.226

~o

.517

.171

.0728

.0226

;:;O

.,>

.107

.0517

.0171

.00728

.00226

;:;O

Rs

.,>

.0107

.00517

.00171

.000728

.000226

~o

5000 Rs

>
"'

.00107

.000517

.000171

.0000728

.0000226

;:;O

0 .so Rs

!10700

5170

1710

728

226

500 Rs

~10. 7

5.17

1.71

• 728

.226

500

6) RELATIVE RISK AVERSION (R)

AT WRAT.TH •

Rs 10000

~o
~o

a)Risk aversion measures can only be computed for indifference points between
any two efficient alternatives. Therefore, one can only assign an interval to
each of the alternatives Oto F. To compute a unique value for each alternative,
one can take the mean of the measures at the endpoints of each interval. In the
case of Z, the interval length did not vary greatly and the arithmetic mean was
used. For Sand the other measures, the interval length increases sharply from
alternative Oto F and therefore the geometric mean was used (with the exception
of alternative E which has a zero endpoint and where the arithmetic mean was used).
Partial risk aversion was computed by solving the equation for indifference betwe~~S
alternative X and Y, using the constant partial risk aversion function U • (1-S)M"' ,
where Mis certain income.
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cription of the method and tests of its reliability, see Binswanger (1978a).
The second panel of Table 1 shows the pattern of behavior of
those 118 individuals who played up to the 50 Rs level,(many more played
only up to the 5 Rs level but their behavior at those low levels is
fully consistent with the behavior of the smaller sample).

When payoffs

are small, (0.50 Rs), we find nearly 50% of individuals in,the intermediate
and moderate risk aversion categories (Band C).

Over a third of indi

viduals show a nearly neutral or risk preferring behavior pattern (E and F)
and less than 10% are extremely or severely risk averse (O and A).

When

game levels rise, the proportion of individuals in the intermediate and
moderate categories rises till it reaches 80% of individuals in these two
classes. Near neutral and risk-preferring behavior virtually disappears,
only one out of 118 individuals chose F.

On the other hand, the fraction

of extreme and severely risk-averse choices stays virtually constant,
only at the 500 Rs level does it rise by roughly 5%.

At higher game levels,

the risk aversion distribution is thus single peaked with most of its
weight in the two intermediate and moderate risk aversion classes.

MODELS BASED ON SECURITY MOTIVES
This class of models has recently been reviewed by Anderson (1975),
whose exposition I will follow.

Anderson also gives references to the

authors who proposed or worked with the various rules.

In all models the

individual has an overridingly important security motiv~ either in ter~s
of minimum income goals or in terms of critical probabilities of experiencing
losses below a critical line.
Some of the rul"?c: to ~e cons:!~ere,.;i l-elm~ assm-:c that individuals
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have specific probabili ty target (P*) in their mind and

are concerned

primarily with the income level which can be achieved with that target
probabili ty.

Other rules assume that individua ls have specific target

incomes or subsisten ce incomes in their mind and are concerned primarily
with reducing the probabili ty of falling below their target incomes.
Finally lexicogra phic rules operate with constrain ts incorpora ting both
target probabil ities and target incomes.
The same basic rules can have different predictio ns depending on how
the income stream is defined over which these targets are measured.

When

the probabili ty destribut ion on overall income--i ncluaing any new prospects -is considere d, the models assume what we may call income integratio n:
the individua l integrate s any new prospect with his old ones and considers
only final income states.

Alternati vely we can have the same rules apply

to the probabili ty distributi on of only a new prospect.

The individua l

then operates with income source specific targets, and this case is
considere d first.

Income Source Specific Targets
Safety-Fi xed or Maximin:

This rule involves the maximiza tion of the

minimum income that can be obtained with a probabili ty of at least a
crucial P*, i.e.
Maximize ~subject to P(X

<

d)

<

P*

(1)

Xis the achieved income from the game and P* is the critical low probabili ty.

7

Maximin is a special case of safety fixed where P* is zero.

Consider

Figure 1 which shows the cumulative frequency distribution s of the game
alternative s at three levels in semi-logarit hmic scale such that equi
proportiona l shifts of game outcomes correspond to equal horizontal distances ..
It is clear from Figure 1 that the decision maker who follows this rule
must, at all game levels, choose alternative O since that gives him the
1
Considering
highest income with a fixed probability of Pc O < P*.
Table 1 we find that at best 2.5% of the individuals can follow this
decision rule since the proportion of individuals choosing alternative
zero is less than that.

Safety fixed without income integration thus

has to be rejected as a framework to describe the observed behavior.
Safety Principle:

This rule involves the minimizatio n of the

probability that income X will fall below some fixed disaster level d*.
The disaster level is usually taken as a subsistence income or alter
natively as a customary income from all sources of income.

This inter-

. pretation will be taken up later but let us first consider a source
specific target or customary income.

This may mak~ little sense for an

unusual income source such as this experiment.

At best we could assume that

individuals would take the unusual opportunity to· obtain sufficient
income from the windfall to pay back a fixed liability which they had
incurred earlier,or that the experimenta l income would make possible un
usual expense such as a pilgrimage for which they need a fixed sum which
they otherwise could not get.

2

This interpretat ion will be tested below.

1When the probability target is greater than 1/2, the decision rule
implies the choice of alternative E.
2Quite a few individuals did indeed use the income from the game for
pilgrimages .

Figure 1
The Income Alternatives When Decision Rules Involve
Source Specific Income and Probability Targets
1
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The rule can formally be written as
Minimize P(X~ d*)
Now consider figure 1.

(2)

Several cases have to be distinguish ed.

1.

Very high target income (d* ). In this case the theory makes
1
no prediction for any game level, because the target income cannot be
achieved in any event.
2.

High target income which can be achieved by the good· luck outcomes

at the highest game level (d* , d* ). With this target income we have no
2
3
prediction for the 5 and 50 Rs level for the reason mentioned above.
But at the 500 Rs level, alternative zero has a 100% probability of falling
below d*

3

and d* 2 , while the probability for alternative s C and Eis only

50% in the case of d* •
3

Hence the decision maker will choose either C or

E and be indifferent between the two.
choose alternative E.

For d*

2

on the other hand he will

We can therefore see that if a set of alternative s

has a low probability of achieving an income target the safety principle
pushes individuals into choosing risky alternative s.

This is the case

even with more complex continuous probability functions because only
the risky alternative s will have a positive probability of achieving those
high levels, hence they will generally have smaller probabiliti es of not
reaching those levels and the individual minimizes those probabiliti es.
3.

Lower target incomes which can be achieved by the good luck

outcomes of all alternative s (d*

to d* ). Under d* all 500 Rs level
7
7
alternative s have a zero probability of not achieving the target income.
4

Hence the rule gives no prediction at that level.

For d*s choices of

0 or Care implied and a unique choice of 0 is only implied by d* , which
4

10

is very close to the sure income.

The indeter minacy presen t here can be

overcom e by lexicog raphic rulesco nsidere d below.
who has income target d*

6

Note that an individ ual

will have to choose Eat the 50 Rs level (for

reasons explain ed in paragra ph 2) and move to the less risky alterna tive
0 or Cat the 500 Rs level.
at

Hence, a tendenc y towards more risk aversio n

higher game levels can be implied in this decisio n rule.
Low Income Target s (d*s to d*

). For such targets the indeter minacy
10
of choice become s acute for the high game levels . d*lo implies no pre
diction anywhe re,

while d*

9

and d*a imply only indiffe rence between 0

and Cat the respec tive game levels and no predic tion elsewh ere.
The decisio n rule thus implies almost random choice except if the
target income is either close to the sure

outcom e at a given game level

or close to the good luck outcom es of the risky games, and even in these
cases only for one game level of the sequen ce.

It would thus imply a

risk aversio n distrib ution which is fairly close to a uniform distrib ution.
It almost imposs ible to rationa lize the game results of Table 1 in
terms of this decisio n rule.
One might object that the specifi c game level induces in the individ ual
such a target commen surate with the game level and with a commit ted expense
of the individ ual which realist ically falls into the set of outcom es.
that leads to a theory with practic ally no predic tive power.

But

To get a

pred~c tion for individ uals one has to elicit a target income (which would
change over time) for any set of alterna tives which confro nts them and
this is an unfeas ible researc h program .
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Lexicograph ic Rules (LSF).Rouma sset has proposed two lexicograph ic
rules which are designed to sharpen the predict:1.ons .

These rules operate

with both a fixed probability target and a fixed income target and assume
that the individual first wants to satisfy a safety constraint.

This

constraint says that he will not accept any alternative which does not
give him a target income with a fixed target probability , i.e.

Prob

(X

<

d*)

<

P*

(3)

When the constraint is satisfied the individual will maximize expected
income.

Note first that to implement it, we need to know both an income

target and a probability target which is an ambitions information requirement.
LSF 2:

The individual maximizes expected income when the safety constraint

is satisfied.
i.e.

When it is not, he follows the safety fixed rule.
max E
s.t.

Prob (X 2. d*) < P*

(3)

Otherwise
maximize d
s.t.

1,

Prob (X

~

d) <

P*

(1)

High income targets (d* , d* , d* , d* ):
1
3
2
4
No one (or only alternative zero at tne 500 level) satisfies (3),

and therefore the individual chooses alternative zero at all game levels.
2)

Intermediat e income targets (d* , d* , d* ): The high game alternative s
5
6
7
satisfy the constraints progressive ly at the 500 Rs level, and the individual
will choose (among those who satisfy it) the one with highest expected
return.

Under d*

7

he will choose alternative Eat the highest game

levels, while continuing to choose zero at the lower game levels.
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Hence the decision rule implies-- for at least some individua ls--a shift
from taking no risk at low game levels to taking the highest risk at the highest
game leveL which is totally inconsist ent with the game results.
3)

Low income targets:

the income target moves down to d* , all
10
alternati ves at the higher game levels satisfy the constrain t (3) and
As

these individua ls should choose conservat ively at only the lowest game
levels but choose Eat the higher levels.
The rule thus clearly implies that, as game levels rise, the risk
aversion distribut ions in Table 1 shoud shift to the right.

This is

the opposite of what happened in the experimen t.

LSF 1 :

This rule implies maximiza tion of expected returns

when the

safety constrain t is satisfied , but using the safety principle when it,
is not:
max E
s.t.

Prob (X

~

d*) < P*

(3)

otherwise
min P(X

~

d*)

(2)

1)

High income targets (d* to d* ): In these cases the constrain t
1
3
is not satisfied and the predie tion are as for the safety first rules,
i.e.· no predictio n for d\ or "risk taking" for d*

2 and d* 3 at the

500 Rs level without any predictio n for the low game levels.

2)

Intermediate income targets (d*

4

to d* ):
7

As the level goes

down, more and more alternatives satisfy the constraint (3).
small shift of the income target from d*
alternative zero to alternative E.

4

to d*

Target d*

7

7

And a

implies a shift from

implies a choice of either

C or E at the 50 Rs level and a choice of E at the 500 Rs level.

Thus we

do find a possibility of observing increasing risk aversion as game levels
rise.

As the target income falls further, within each of the game levels

the cycle from "no prediction"-+ehoice of most risky alternative -+- choice
of last risky alternative-+- choice of most risky alternative repeats
itself, implying that in the measured risk aversion distributions we
should observe all choices.
3)

Low income targets:

These imply that at all high game levels

the choice of E must be made with a possibility of conservative choices
only at the lowest game levels.
Evidently we do not know the distribution of target incomes and thus
cannot really predict the distribution of choices in the games.

But

consider the three following alternatives:
Everyone has high target incomes:

since that implies no predictions

for the low game levels we should expect a fairly uniform distribution
of risk aversion at the low and intermediate game levels.

This is not

the case since alternatives 0 and 1 are almost never chosen at low game
levels.

Furthermore, at the 5 Rs level we already observe a reduction

in the proportion of nearly-risk neutral choices.
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Everyone has low target incomes:

this implies that at high game

levels most observations should be concentrated at the risk-neutral
level of the spectrum.
A fairly even distribution of target incomes over the interval d*io
to d*i·

This implies that at least some individuals should find that

all of the high payoff alternatives exceed their target incomes and
choose Eat high levels, which is again not what we observe.
Note how important the knowledge of the target incomes is for these
theories.

Slight variations in them sharply,and cyclically,alter the

preference ordering of alternatives with outcomes in the range of the
target incomes. The burden on accuracy of measurement of target incomes
is high.
Since all the rules with income source specific targets have
implications which are inconsistent with the observations we will now
move to consider overall income targets.

Overall Income Targets or Income Integr~tion
We shall see below that in many cases, to make predictions about
behavior, we must know the probability distribution of income F(I)
with which the game prospects have to be aggregated (Income Integration).
Note again, that this adds a large information requirement.

Often we

will.have to know the--presumably subjective--probability distribution
of aggregate income of the individual as well as a probability target
and/ or an income target.
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If f(I) is the density function of an individuals income and F(l)
its cumulative density, and if Lis the bad-luck outcome of an alternative
while U is the good-luck outcome,then the cumulative distribution of income
with the prospect (say C) is
F(I + C) = 1/2 F(I + L) + 1/2 F(I + U)
Graphically this can be shown in figure two:

F(I) is not shown, but

instead F(I + 0) is the distribution of income with the sure prospect
of 50 Rs.

(It is found by simply shifting F(I) by 50 Rs).

The cumulative

distributions F(I + L) and F(I + U) are found by shifting F(I + 0) by
the appropriate amounts and F(I + C) is the simple sum of half of the
values of the two at each point.
the distribution of

The graph also shows F(I + E), i.e.

the more risky prospect E (without its correspond

ing distributions of bad-and good-luck outcomes).
The basic feature of the new cumulative probability density functions
F(I + 0) to F(I + E) is that they will cross.

Because the expected return

of each succeeding alternative from O tc Eis

density functions will cross before or when they reach P = 1/2.

But

this is about all what we can say about the new functions without knowledge
of the old ones.

Figure 3 shows the lower portions of cumulative distri

butions for three alternatives at two of the game levels.
Integrating the prospects with total income changes
the predictions for the Safety-Fixed rules:

Let D be the income achievable

with a fixed probability P* and let the individual behave according to the
safety fixed rule
Max D

s.t. Prob (I~ D) < P*

(la)

Figure 2
Cumulative Distributions of Game Alternatives with an Overall Income Goal
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Cumulative Distribution of Game Alternatives at Different Levels
With Overall Income Goal
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Without "income integration" this rule implied choice of alternative

zero in all cases where P* < 1/2.

But with income integration (figure

3) the choice depends on target probabilities.

When they are low, such

as P* ,the risk.less alternatives will be chosen.
1
shifts to more and more risky alternatives.

As they rise, the choice

This rule, therefore, is

unable to give us any prediction about the behavior of individuals when
confronted with the experimental at any game level.
falsified by the experiment.

Hence it cannot be

It is difficult to imagine an experiment

which could falsify it, since knowledge of personal probability targets
and personal probability distributions of overall income is required.
Given the difficulties faced in eliciting certainty equivalents by inter
views (see Binswanger 1978'1~ the prospects for falsification or support
of this model are not good.
Income integration has less impact on the qualitative predictions
under the safety principle, i.e.

(2a)

Note tha~ if the notion of target income is based on physical subsistence
requirements, variations in the target income relative to the distributions
shown in Figure 1 have a clear interpretation:

Poor people should have

high subsistence incomes and rich people low ones relative to their probability
distributions of income.

Or said otherwise,poor people should have

high probabilities of not achieving their subsistence income while rich
people should have low ones.
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Very high subsistence income n* , which cannot be reached in any case
1
(very poor people): The model implies no predictions since all probabiliti es

1)

of not reaching D* are equal to 1.
High subsistence D* to n* (poor people). The model implies that poor
2
5
people should choose the risky alternative s in some of the low level games.
2)

In the highest-lev el game, some of the poor people (those with subsistence
incomes between D* and the right endpoint of the distributon of E
)
2
500
should choose the most risky alternative s. Evidently this is inconsisten t
with the experimenta l evidence.

*2

As the subsistence income falls from D

to n* the choice will shift rapidly to the least risky alternative zero.
5

The model continues to imply that some of the poorest people behave in a
risky manner at high payoffs, and that they should do so at higher frequencies
at the low game levels.

Yet we find very few poor people chosing E and F

at any game level.
3)

Low income targets (rich people).

The model quickly looses predictive

power, first for the high game level (D*) and then the lower game levels
7

*
(D9).
Lexicograph ic rules:

Both lexicograph ic rules imply the maximizatio n

of expected returns when the safety constraint is satisfied, i.e.
max E
s.t. Prob. (I

*
2 D)

<

P*

(3a)

These rules imply that we should observe the richer individuals (low D)
*
at the risk-neutra l end of the distributio n of risk attitudes.

Further

more, since the probability that all alternative s satisfy the constraint
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(3a) rises as the game level rises, we should expect an increasing
frequency of risk neutrality as the game level rises, or at least not
a decreasing frequency.

This is totally opposite to what we observe in

the experiment and the lexicographic rules can be rejected.
Note that this ground for rejection is independent of how the target
income is defined, i.e. does not depend on a physiological need inter
pretation of the target income.

Consider the following most favorable

case for the lexicographic models:

Individuals, on the basis of their

assets and incomes form a target income and probability such as D* and
7
pl*

for which, under "usual" conditions, they have a fairly low probabily

of falling short of.

This gets around the objections that a safety based

theory should not predict risk taking on the part of the poorest groups,
which arises either by a high target probability or a physiological subsistence
income.

Nevertheless the lexicographic rules with customary income still

predict that the proportion of risk-neutral individuals cannot fall as the
game level rises.

This is contradicted by the evidence.

A customary

subsistence income model also poses the additional difficulty that one
has to know three elements to make individual predictions:

personal

subsistence income, personal probability target and subjective probability
distribution of income.

This is a tall order.

Add to this the evidence

that people have serious difficulties in evaluating low probabilities, (i.e.
the tails of distributions) and you have created a model more complex than
all utility based models.
The only security based model which is not inconsistent with the
experimental evidence is the safety-fixed model with income integration.

The

2J

only reason for its surviva l is that it offers no predicti on whatsoe ver
unless persona l probabi lity targets and subjecti ve probabi lity distribu 
tions of overall incomes are known.

The advocate s of the 100del have yet

to propose how to measure these before the model can become operatio nal.
Finally note that all models which operate with subsiste nce income
targets imply predicti ons which have been contrad icted in this study.
sample includes some of the poorest househo lds of the world.

The

If subsiste nce

income models do not operate here, it is hard to imagine where else they could
operate .
One way to defend these rules against the experim ental result
just reported is to say that the experim ental situatio n--bein g too simple
--falls into a wholly differen t compartm ent of behavio r than producti on or
labor supply decision s, and that the evidence is therefor e inconclu sive.
That, of course, makes it much harder to subject the models to empirica l
tests.

1

A modified version of this objectio n would not reject the experi-

mental evidence but reason that humans divide decision s into usual decision s
and unusual decision s with the game clearly being unusual .
would then apply only to the usual decision s.

Rnl

<>!':

nf t-httmh

If we were to categor ize

all windfal l gains as unusual, this would deprive the security based theories
of much of their usefuln ess.

New technolo gies offered at subsidiz ed costs

by the governm ent, or employm ent opportu nities on short run rural projects
are windfal l gains and one would like to predict technolo gy adoption or labor
supply to such projects using the theoreti cal framewo rks. Usual behavior
1

For econome tric evidence against subsiste nce income as an importan t
determin ant of wage rates in rural India, see Bardhan , (1978).
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can often be observed and need not be predicted .
Finally one might object that the experimen t is not a good test
because it does not subject the individua l to losses.

In an earlier

paper I showed tha~ when people were given the money for the game one
day in advance and had to bring it back to play and put at risk, their
decisions did not differ statistic ally from the ones when the payouts came
only after the game was played.
like real losses.

They treated opportuni ty losses much

Even without this, to maintain that losses must occur

to test the theories is one form of compartem entalizatio n of the mind,
i.e. it says that any windfall income is not counted when it comes to
compute subsisten ce income.

This brings us back to assume multiple

independe nt income targets for different sources of income, which reduces
the predictiv e power of the rules and increases the difficult y in using
them for predictio ns.

In the decades since theorizin g with subsisten ce

income targets starte~ little progress has been made at measuring one
single target and to make it empirical ly operation al.

Thinking of

measuring multiple targets is a nightmare to an empirical investiga tor.
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MODELS BASED ON UTILITY COMPARISONS

Utility-based models of behavior under uncertainty have been developed
by statisticians, economists and mathematical psychologists.
careful review of these models is Luce and Suppes (1965).

An very

Relatively few

major new theoretical proposals have been made since that review.

In this

section the basic forms of utility functions are reviewed in their deter
ministic version.

For a review of probabilistic choice theories the reader

is referred to Luce and Suppes. 1
The basic tenet of all utility models is an attempt to associate with
each action or prospect aj a unique utility value Uj such that a
decision maker will choose or prefer a
utility value of a

1

1

over a

2

(a

exceeds the utility value of a

1
2

~

a ) i~ and only i~ the
2

or is equal to it; i.e.,

where~ indicates a relationship of preference or indifference.

The

outcome of each action depends on which event Ei will occur out of an
Exclusive Exhaustive set of Events (EEE).

An

EEE is a set of events from

which one event Ei must happen but more than one cannot happen.

In all

formulations the decision maker is assumed to associate objective proba
bilities or subjective probabilities (or decision weights) with each
event of the EEE.
Furthermore, the action aj associates an outcome xij with each

1

In most probabilistic models the assertion is made that the probability
of choosing a will be larger than that of choosing a if U(a ) > U(a ).
1
2
2
1
In some versions the probability of choosing ai is related to the difference
between U(a ) and U(a ). In random models the utility function is assumed to be
1
2
random, while the choice is deterministic.
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event Ei.

The outcome Xij can be any

object pr-0viding satisfaction or utility

but for this discussion we will consider it as the money income (or wealth)
accruing to the individual if he chooses action aj and the event Ei occurs.
Money income is evaluated according to a utility function U(X) which asso
ciates a real number to the income X.
For simplicity, the discussion which follows will be restricted to
discontinuous probability functions.

All the theories discussed below have

the following structure of utility function in common:
(5)

where ki is a "probability" measure in an objective or subjective sense.
Note that in this formulation utility and probability combine multiplica
tively for each individual event and that these products are summed over
the set of events.

Amos Tversky (1967) has tested this basic formulation

experimentally for a large class of more specific models which can be
derived from 5 and found his experimental results to be consistent with
additivity.
Basic disagreements among theorists arise about the form of the
utility function associated with outcomes, about whether to use objective
or subjective probabilities, about how subjective probabilities are
formed and whether subjective probabilities over a set of EEE should
add up to one or not.

(All agree that objective probabilities add up

to one.)
Table 2 presents
with equation 5.

the six subclasses of utility models consistent

The first three have been developed and refined by

mathematicians , statisticians and economists, while the last three stem
from the work of experimental and mathematical psychologists.

These

Table 2:

Utility Function a
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Expected Income
El

U • pixi

Expected Utility
Ul

u - P1U(Xi)

1

2

Subjective Expected
Utility
SEU
StatisticsEconomics version

U3 • fhiU(Xi)

Subjective Expected
Utility
SEU
Psychology version

u • fh(Pi)U(Xi)

Subjective Expected
Income
SEI
(C-E approach)

4

5

U • fh(Pi)Xi

Assumptions of Models based on Utility Comparisons

Emphasis b

a/
b/
c/
d/

el
f/

Revision of
Subjective
d
Probabilities

Asset
Integratione

normative

Usually
assumed

normative

Usually
assumed

normative

Yes

According to
Bayes'
Theorem

predictive

Yes

Learning Theories

predictive

6
Nonadditive
U a fh(Pi)U(Xi)
predictive
Subjective Expected
Utility
NASEU
6
Prospect Theory
u • U(X) +
n
1
version
+ f. 2h(Pi)[U(Xi)-U(X 1)J
Notes:

Adding up of
Subjective
Probabilitiesc

Yes
No

Usually
assumed

No

No
Learning Theories

No
Ruled
out

Autho/

Bernoulli (1738)
Von Neumann
Morgenstern (1947)
Ramsey (1926),
de Finetti (1937)
Savage Mosteller and
No gee (195l) *
Coombs & Beardslee*
(1955), Edwards*
(1953, 1954 a,b)
Preston & Baratta*
(1948), Griffith *
(1949), Sprowls*
(1953), Randa (1977)
Edwards (1955)
Kahnernann and
Tversky (1977)

U • Utility index, X • Money outcome, P • Objective probability, h • Subjective probability.
Indicates whether the emphasis of the authors proposing the theory was predictive or normative-prescriptive.
Indicates whether subjective probabilities are assumed to sum to one or not,
Indicates whether the theoretical framework proposes a theory of how the subjective probabilities are revised when
the decision maker receives new information or forecasts.
Indicates whether the utility function is usually assumed to be stable in final wealth states.
The authors who provided axi,omatic foundations are underlined • Stars refer to early experimental work using the
models explicitly or implicitly,

,..,
J1
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two traditions of modeling have their origins in different questions,
although these questions later ¥ere mixed up.

The statistical-econ omic

tradition started by asking how a person should behave in a situation
of uncertainty if his decisions were to be consistent with his preferences
and with basic tenets

of logic and consistency.

All writers seem

to

agree that it is in a person's interest to behave according to the sta
tistical-econom ic model which fits his preferences and state of informa
tion, i.e., they are generally regarded as the superior normative models.
The psychological theories can result in various inconsistencies of
choice.

But the psychologist's basic interest is in finding regularities

in how people actually behave, i.e., the basic purpose is predictive or
positive.

Economists use normative models for some purposes and pre

dictive models for others.

The dominant tendency has been to use the

normative models for prediction purposes as welJ-at least as a first
approximation.

There has been surprisingly little interest in economics

to experimentally test whether the normative models are useful for pre
dictive purposes.
Probability Formation or Preference
In Table 2 the symbol Pi stands for objective probabilities while
hi stands for subjective probabilities.
are called by different names:

The subjective probabilities

personal probabilities, probability

preferences (Edwards, 1954b; Preston and Baratta, 1948), Certainty
Equivalent Utility Index (Handa, 1977), or simply weights (Kahnemann
and Tversky, 1977).
The Expected Income (EI) model was the starting point for all later
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work.

Few authors argue that people behave according to this model since

it implies no aversion to risk, but it is often stated that the proper
set of economic institutio ns (continge nt markets, insurance , financial
instrumen ts) allow people and firms to behave as if they were maximizin g
expected income.

The expected utility model was proposed by Bernoulli (1738)

in terms of objective probabili ties and its axiomatic foundatio ns in
terms of objective probabili ties were derived by von Neumann and Morgen
stern (1947).

Savage (1954) provided an axiomatic treatment of the Sub

jective Expected Utility (SEU) theory which is based on personal probabilities.

Despite cautionar y remarks by Savage 1 ,the SEU model has been widely

used for deriving predictio ns of how people behave when confronte d with
certain situation s (see, for example, Diamond and Stiglitz 1974, or
Rothschil d and Stiglitz 1971, 1970).
The SEU theory also has developed a framework for analyzing how
personal probabil ities are revised when the decision maker receives addi
tional evidence.

They are revised according to Bayes theorem which

explains the posterior probabili ties as a combinati on of prior probabil ities
and the likelihoo d of an observed event. 2
The psycholog ical models have their roots in experimen tal work on
gambling.

In a series of articles Preston and Baratta (1948), Griffith

(1949), Sprowls (1953) and Edwards (1953, 195~ a,b) showed that in gambling

1
· The title of Savage's book is Foundatio ns of Statistic s which implies
that--at least initially- -he had a normative theory in mind. Many of his comments
(see also Savage, 1972) stress the benefit of teaching a decision maker to use
the model and learn to introspec t about his personal probabil ities, and Savage
fully expected that actual behavior would often diverge fromthe postulate d
behavior.
2

For a good descriptio n of this method see Anderson et al., 1977.
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situations people act as if they had clear preferences for certain
probabilities rather than others (the probability preference literature).
In most of these experiments the respondents were told the ob.1ective pro
babilities of winning and losing and attempts were made to relate the
objective probabilities to subjective ones.

Most experimenters fotn1d a

relationship which looks roughly as follows:
Personal
probability

,
0

Figure 4:

Objective probability

1

General shape of probability preference functions.

Figure 4 indicates an overestimation of low probabilities and an underestimation of high probabilitie& with a crossover point varying from 0.05

1
to 0.25 on the objective probability scale. Edwards' experiments, however, showed marked preference for probabilities cf 1/2 ~hen the expected

income from the alternatives considered was positive.

He found marked

preferences for low probabilities of losing large amounts when expected
income from the games considered were negative.

The probability pre

ference literature thus shows that a unique and stable functional
relationship between the subjective and objective probabilities could not
be found, but Edwards hoped that a few fairly stable functional relation-

1crossover points in the neighborhood of 0.20 were found in a bidding
game for play money by Preston and Baratta, and by Griffith and McGlothlin
(1956), using data from betting on horses. Sprowls (1953) finds crossover
points between 0.05 to 0.25. Shuford's (1959) experiments and Davidson,
Suppes and Siegel also found underestimation of high probabilities but
·
crossover points varied.
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ships could be identifie d for different "types" of situation s:

one for

the case when all outcomes are positive, one when all are negative;a nd a
few more for various situation s with some outcomes positive and some
negative.
The early work of Preston and Baratta , Griffith and Sprow1 8 --implici tly
or explicitly --was based on the Subjectiv e Expected Income (SEI) model
which weighs

probabil ities of events but assumes linear utility for

money outcomes.

When measuring probabili ty preferenc e functions experi

mentally this assumptio n is usually necessary , or otherwise the same set
of choices can be interpret ed as arising out of an Expected Utility Model
and be used to measure the curvature of the utility function.

In fact

Mosteller and Nogee (1951) computed utility weights as well as probabili ty pr~fercnc e
in alternati ve interpret ations of their poker-dic e experimen t.

Edwards

recognize d this ambiguity early and his experimen tal technique s roughly
adjust for nonlinear utility by having individua ls choose among bets
with equal expected value.

1

His early theoretic al work then developed

what may be called the psycholog ical version of the subjectiv e expected utility
model (Edwards, 1955).

This psycholog ic~l version differs from the

statistica l-econom ic version only in the stress on the stable functiona l
relations hip between subjectiv e and objective probabil ities.

1 Another technique for measuring both expected utility and subjectiv e
probabil ities simultane ously was developed by Gordon M. Becker (1962).
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The Subjective Expected income model has recently been revived by
Handa (1977) under the name of Certainty Equivalent approach and provided
with a set of axiomatic foundations. 1 Note that--well in the economic

tradition--the axioms which Handa uses do not require a stable functional
relationship between subjective and objective probabilities, in fact
they could also be revised according to Bayes' rule.

Nevertheless, all

of Randa's illustrations and predictions are based on two functions between
subjective and objective probability:

one function for probabilities

attached to gains and one function attached to losses.
The probability functions h(Pi) underlying the SEI and the psycholo
gical SEU approach confront one difficulty discussed in detail by Edwards
(1954, p. 398, 1962):

If a subjective probability function such as the

one in Figure 4 is stable and is to be used for event sets with more than
two possible events, then the subjective probabilities over the full event
set cannot sum to one.

This may best be illustrated with an example:

In evaluating an action aj which has three equally likely outcomes with
objective probability of 1/3 each, the subjective probabilities of
Figure 4 would all either exceed one-third or fall short of it, except at
the crossover point.

They could therefore sum to one only at the place

where objective probability equals subjective probability.

This problem

is more general and Edwards has shown that subjective probabilities associated with a stable probability function can sum to one if and only if
subjective probability equals objective probability everywhere.

To get

any further with the idea of a stable functional relationship between

1 For

a critique of Randa's approach, see Fishburn (1978).
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objective and subjective probabilities Edwards (1962) relaxed the addi
tivity assumption for the subjective probabilities and developed the
Non-Additive Subjective Expected Utility (NASEU) model number 6.

As

Kahne~ann and Tversky (1977) point out, this model faces a fundamental
consider the prospect a• (x + £, p; x, 1 - p), i.e., a

difficulty:

two outcome gamble where the first outcome is equal to the second outcome
plus£.
be

u6

The utility of this prospect, according to the NASEU model, will
• h(p) U(X

+£) + h(l -

p)

U(x).

As£ goes to zero, i.e., as

we approach a certain income of amount X, the utility will tend to

6
u • U(X) [h(p) + h(p - 1)).

Unless the sum of the subjective probabili

ties is one, this will not approach U(X), which is inadmissible.

To

overcome this problem Kahn,emann and Tversky(who call their version Prospect
Theory) look at the utility function from its lowest possible outcome x ,
1
which is certain.
_as

The utility of the action or prospect is then computed
n

6

u • U(X1 ) + i: 2 h(pi)[U(Xi) - U(X 1 )]

(6)

The decision maker first evaluates the difference in utilities between each
outcome and the lowest possible outcome (except for x , of course).
1
He then weighs these differences by the subjective probabilities and
adds them up.
outcome.

This sum is then added to the utility of the lowest possible

It is easily verified that the utility of a prospect such as

(a) discussed above will approach U(X) as£ approaches zero even if the
subjective probabilities do not sum to one.
In addition Kahnemann and Tverskygive some axiomatic foundations
to their theory

which allow the decision-maker to be less than fully

consistent in his decisions.

They also describe a substantial amo\ffit of

evidence {based on sets of hypothetical choices) which is inconsistent
with the standard SEU theory but consistent with Prospect Theory, i.e.,
.
.
1
the modified NASEU model.
The asstunption of one (or several) functional relationships between
objective and subjective probabilities--which is stressed so much in the
psychological literature--is quite alien to the statistical-economic
theories of subjective probability.

Few economically

relevant situations exist in which an individual knows
probabilities.

Exceptions are simple games or bets.

the objective
(In more complex

card games it is difficult to know or remember the objective probabili
ties even for a mathematically trained person.)
are not of the simple game type.

Most economic decisions

Furthermore, if a decision maker were

to try to make use of additional information to revise his subjective prob
abilities,using Bayes or any other rule, no stable relationship could
exist between objective and subjective probabilities:

each additional

piece of information would result in a new function over a prespecified
set of objective probabilities.

To be fair, it has to be stressed

that psychologists were often interested in specifically predicting

1

The sets of hypothetical questions were asked from about 100 individuals
and r.esembled the following question: Choose between A and B, where
A:

2500 with probability 0.33
2400 with probability 0.66
0 with probability 0.1

B:

2400 with certainty

The amounts were in Israeli pounds. These types of questions are oumewhat simpler tha
in cne interview method Which I used to elicit utility functions.
In particular they do .not attempt to elicit a numerical scale value of utility.
Eliciting utility values has been shown to be quite tmreliable and potentially mis
leading in systematic ways (see Appendix of Binswanger 1978a).
u.v.,,oe: a1:11<..~o
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gambling behavior and not, as statisticians and economists, in a universal
theory of behavior under uncertainty.
But even if the stable link between objective and subjective proba
bilities is de-emphasized, it still is important to find out whether sub
jective probabilities do indeed add to one in actual decision situations.
The psychological literature contains evidence on other behavioral regu
larities which are inconsistent with the subjective expected utility models
to warrant further experimental efforts. 1

In view of the strong impact of

payoff size on choice

experiment,

found

in

the

one can only hope that future experiments will be based on real decisions
rather than hypothetical ones and that experimentation will occur at
larger payoffs than the extremely small ones of most of the psychological
experiments.
When I started my own experiments of risk aversion I was unaware of
the psychological models, some of which have only recently received renewed
attention.

It turns out, however, that the simple method for evaluating

the utility function using 50% probabilities for two positive outcomes is
the correct approach.

The subjective probabilities of

the two outcomes, even if not equal to one-hal4 would be equal to each other
and therefore probability preferences cannot influence the measures of
the curvature of the utility function.

In fact, considering something

like the SEU model, Ramsey (1926) had already proposed to use 50-50
probabilities to first evaluate utility function and then use the utility

1 In

particular, Tversky (1969) has shown that one can construct alternatives
for choice which will result in the observation of predictable intransiti
vities of choice. Grether and Plott (1977) have carefully replicated and
expanded a sequence of experiments hy psychologists which uncovered strong
preference reversal phenomena.
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function so derived to estimate personal probabiliti es for other choices.
Choosing 50-50 probabiliti es has the obvious disadvantag e that
component of aversion to--or preference for-risky prospects which arises
out of probability preferences cannot be measured, much less can we test
anything about such preferences with the experimenta l results.
But from the experimenta l results we can at least reject some of
the theoretical frameworks of Table 2.

The utility function is nonlinear

and risk-averse in money income for all but one out of 118 individuals .
This rules out the Expected Income and the Subjective Expected Income
(Certainity Equivalent) Approaches as predictive models for the rural
households considered.

The Subjective Expected Utility approach is in fact rejected by a
direct contradictio n of one of its basic axioms which Handa (1,77) postu
lated~ This axiom (called "enhanced prospects" by Handa) says that the
~ank.ing of bets should be unaffected by multiplicat ive transformat ion of all
of their outcomes by the sa~e constant.

In a sense it does not rule out

risk aversion, but it assumes what amounts to constant partial risk aversion.
Randa is uneasy about this assumption but defends it by saying that it

may hold for ganes in the neighborhoo d of normal business transaction s.
But normal business transaction s of the households considered clearly
include all payoff sizes from the 0.50 to the 500 Rs game.

And the ordering

of prospect changes for most individuals within that range.

1 For a discussion of theoretical problems associated
with Randa's
approach, see Fishburn (1978).

3.,

Asset Integration and Measures of Risk Aversion
In making use of the concept of a utility function economists have
usually chosen to write the utility function as a function of wealth W,
i.e.,

U • U(W)

(7)

We must note that W must be the certainty equivalent of current wealth
and that it may be difficult to measure it. 1 Economists have been postulated
what Kahnemann and Tversky (1977) call Asset Integration :

The action or

prospect (X,P) is acceptable at asset position W if and only if
U(W + X, P)

>

U(W), where X and Pare vectors of outcomes and their cor

responding probabiliti es.

The decision maker is assumed to make his

decisions in terms of final wealth states and not in terms of gains and
losses.

A very good theoretical reason to do so is that such a theory

guarantees that opportunity gains and losses are treated in the same way
by the decision makers as "real" losses.

It rules out all compartmen talization

of decision making.
Most economists who have tried to empirically measure utility ftmctions
have, however, chosen to use functional representat ions of a utility function which would be stable over time in terms of income or tain~ and losses.
for example, Halter and Dean, 1971, or Anderson et al., 1977.)

(See,

This is partly due

to the fact that it is extremely difficult to estimate certain wealth, a point to
which we will return later.
1

In addition. Markovitz (1952) hAe pro~o~ed a utility

clifford Hildredth has shown that treating all risky decisions as
if they were taken from a position of certain wealth,whic h has no random
fluctuation s,hides many complexitie s. In particular it tends to neglect
the effect on decisions of covariance of the initial wealth prospects and the
new venture. Other things equal, a positive covariance should tend to
reduce the willingness to engage in a new venture.
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function with alternating concave and convex segments which is time-stable
in terms of gains and losses.

He was prompted to propose this form of

utility function when he tried to find a utility function which would have
some of the properties of that proposed by Friedmann and Savage (1948), but
which avoided some of the apparent inconsisten cies with observed gambling
and insurance behavior encountered by the Friedmann and Savage utility
function which is time-table in

terms of wealth.

Markovitz proposed that

gains and losses should be evaluated relative to a "usual" point of wealth,
but that the utility function would adjust to new wealth positions as a
person became used to it (see Figure 5 below).

The psychologic al literature

has always worked with utility functions in terms of gains and losses (or
income), usually using current wealth and not customary wealth with respect
to which to evaluate gains and losses.
All these approaches have therefore used a utility function of the
form

(8)

U = V(M)

w--here Mis certain income or the certainty equivalent of a prospect=

The difference between the two approaches is tmimportant , as long as
one does not make an assumption of stability over time.

After all, suppose

we measure a utility function V(M) in terms of gains and losses (up to a
linear transformat ion), at any given time the following relation holds
under the assumption of asset integration .

ucw 0 + M)
where

w0

is current (certain) wealth.

= V(M)

(9)

We can proceed to find the func-
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to a linea r trans form ation )
tiona l form for U which is clear ly deter mine d (up
ovitz and the psych olo
by equa tion (8). However, the probl em is that Mark
behav ior from ''wig gles"
gical tradi tion deriT e spec ific impl icatio ns for
incom e, and that they
of the utili ty funct ion aroun d the poin t of zero
of zero incom e regar dless
assum e that these wigg les remai n aroun d the value
indiv idual .
of the "usua l" or actua l weal th posit ion of the

If one write s

"wig gles" aroun d the
a utili ty funct ion in terms of weal th and meas ures
highe r weal th leve ls,
prese nt weal th posit ion, but a smoo th curva ture at
h posit ions. More
the "wig gles" will not be "tran sport ed" to new wealt
ty funct ion in terms of
_gen erally , the curva ture prop ertie s of the utili
leave s that weal th
weal th will rema in the same at that poin t when one
unter s curva ture prop ertie s
posit ion,a nd at the new weal th posit ion one enco
which were there even befor e one moved there .
that it allow s one to use
The great advan tage of the weal th form ulatio n is
measu red (or •ostl y just assum ed)
know ledge abou t the shape of a utili ty funct ion
of an indiv idual after
befor e the weal th chang e to evalu ate the beha vior
ictio n of the effec ts of
a weal th chang e. All theo retic al-an alyti cal pred
been deriv ed
weal th on portf olio choic e or savin gs·be havio r have
in this parti cula r way.

in
A utili ty funct ion which is stabl e over time

e such conc lusio ns unles s
terms of gains and losse s canno t be used to deriv
chang e as wealt h chang es.
one also spec ifies how the utili ty funct ion will
ip.
One thus needs to meas ure an addi tiona l relat ionsh

This does not imply

idual with respe ct to
. that one canno t pred ict the beha vior of an indiv
of his weal th. But that
large gains and losse s such as those of the order
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functio n cannot be used once the person receive s a massive income or
experie nces a massive loss.

The new utility functio n may be flatter

around the new wealth positio n or show more curvatu re, but it might essen
tially have the same "wiggle s" around the point of zero income.

And this

point may corresp ond to a point on the old utility functio n where the
latter had no "wiggl es" and an entirel y differe nt curvatu re.
In looking at axioma tic treatme nts of the subjec tive expecte d utility
model (see, for exampl e, Arrow, 1971), it is clear that the set of
axioms used do not imply that the utility functio n is one which is stable
over
time in terms of wealth since the theory is timeles s.

All consist ency and

transit ivity axioms are specifi ed in terms of the proper ties of a prefere
nce
orderin g over prospe cts or actions of the form (X,,V, where ! is a vector
of
outcome and Pa vector of probab ilities.

One can always add

w0

or any other

constan t to all X for all prospe cts and obtain the same prefere nce orderin
g
among them with consist ency and transit ivity proper ties.

Thus the axioms

have no "prefer ence" for a utility functio n which is stable over time
in
either wealth or income .

Further more, the axioms are all about consist ency

of decisio ns over a set of prospe cts availa ble~•

To obtain a stable

utility functio n in wealth we must make an additio nal assump tion of in
varianc e of the utility functio n (not the utility levels on the functio
n) to
changes in wealth or time.

This assump tion has usually crept in by the back

door of conven ience rather than being made explic it.
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One way to test whether utility functions should be specified as
stable in terms of wealth or in terms of gains and losses is to inspect
measured utility functions for "wiggles" around zero gain and loss or
for relatively larger or lower risk aversion around that point than at
other points.

The best way to do this would be to observe the behavior

of the·same individual with respect to relatively small gambles before
and after a large wealth change.

That is usually not possible and in

the empirical section we will rely more on the evidence across indivi
duals in different wealth classes.

In an intuitive sense, if we should

observe that risk aversion varies in systematic ways with payoff size
and much more rapidly than with respect to equivalent wealth changes
across individuals, this would tend to support the concept of a utility
function in terms of income rather than wealth.
Measures of Risk Aversion and a Test of Asset Integration
The ideas above can be expressed more rigorously in term~
of the behavior of various risk aversion measures.

Assume that a utility

function, as in Figure 5, has been measured:
U(W)
V(X)

- - - - ~ ~ - - - - ' - - - - 7 Certain
Figure 5:

/

income

Wealth

Markovitz-type Utility Function on an Income and Wealth Scale

On

the vertical axis utility has been measured both in terms of income

V(M) and wealth U(W), while the horizontal axis measures certain income
Mand wealth W.
wealth scale.

Mon the income scale corresponds to W +Mon the

In what follows all derivatives and utilities will be

measured at Mand W +Mon each of the scales, i.e., we will be looking
at the point Bon the utility function.
Obviously it is true that
V(M) -= U(W

+

0

M)

VM = Uw = UM

VMM = Uwi.;r = UMM

(10)

where the subscripts denote derivatives of the functions with respect
to the subscripts at the point (w + M). Pratt has defined the followin~
O
measures of risk aversion for a utility function in wealth:
Absolute Risk Aversion

(11)

Relative Risk Aversion
When we evaluate Rat the point (W~
. u + M). this becomes

R = (W

0

+ M)A

Finally both Menezes and Hanson (1970) as well as Zeckhauser and
Keeler (1970) have defined the following measure

S = - MA
Menezes and Hanson used the term Partial Risk Aversion for S, which I will
also follow.

(Zechhauser and Keeler used the term

Size-of-Risk Aversion.)

Partial Risk Aversion is equal to Relative Risk Aversion for indivi
duals with zero wealth.

Partial risk aversion on a utility function in
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gains and losses is--in a sense--eq uivalent to relative risk ~v~r~ion on
a utility function in wealth, with the certainty equivalen t of the
prospect replacing the certain wealth.

As

shown by several authors, the

three measures are related to each other as follows at the point (W + M)
0

(14)
In fact once A,

w0

and Mare known, all three can be computed from A.

Since A can be computed from both a utility function in terms of income
as well as one in terms of wealth, it does not matter for measureme nt
purposes with whlch specifica tion one starts.
The three measures have the following interpret ation:
prospect( !,!:_) where X and Pare vectors.
the behavior of an individua l

Consider the

Absolute Risk Aversion traces

to the prospect (!,!'.), when his wealth

rises and prospect remains the same.

Decreasin g absolute risk aversion

is usually assumed and implies that an individua l's willingne ss to accept
a given fair gamble should rise as his wealth riReR.
Relative risk aversion traces the behavior of an individua l as both
his wealth and the size of the prospect (!,_!'.) rise.

Let t be a scalar.

We are consideri ng the individua l in a new position where he now owns
wealth tW and is confronte d with the prospect (t!,f).

Increasin g relative

risk aversion was hypothesi zed by Arrow (1971) and implies that an indi
vidual's willingne ss to accept a given gamble decreases when both his
wealth and all outcomes of a gamble are multiplie d by the same constant.
· Partial risk aversion traces the behavior of an individua l when the
scale of the prospect changes but his wealth remains the same.

Increasin g

partial risk aversion implies a decrease in the willingne ss of the indi
vidual to take a gamble as the size of the prospect varies.
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Diamond and Stiglitz · (1974), demonRtTAtP. thP. hehAvinT
of the risk premium in relationship to the three
measures.

The risk premium

n is a function of both wealth Wand the

prospect Z • (!,r), and is the amount of money one would have to pay an
individual to accept a gamble or the amount of insurance he would be
willing to pay not to have to play a gamble, i.e., it is the amount of
certain income which makes the individual indifferent between accepting
or rejecting a gamble.

Implicitly it is defined as follows:

U[W + E(Z) - IT(W,Z)]

C

EU(W + Z)

where Eis the expectation operator.

IT(W,Z) is the absolute risk premium,

Il(tW,tZ)/t is the relative risk premium as a proportion of both wealth
and size of prospect whileII(W,tZ)/t is what we may call the "partial"
risk premium as a proportion of the size of the prospect.
Stiglitz

Diamond and

show that the absolute risk premium (relative; partial) rises

or falls with t according to whether absolute (relative; partial) risk
aversion is greater or less than zero.
Note that the behavior of the absolute risk aversion coefficient
is the same with respect to income as well as initial wealth, i.e.,

~y taking the derivative of equation (12) it is also clear that the beha

vior of the relative risk aversion coefficient is the same with respect to
income and initial wealth.)
Equation (16) is a testable implication of the assumption
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of asset integration and must be fulfilled for stable utility functions
in terms of wealth.

This will be done below.

In contrast to A and R, the partial risk aversion coefficient responds
differently to changes in wealth than income.
SW"'~

0

aW

(17 J
S

M

-=A+~

aw

Since A is positive the response of the partial risk aversion coefficient
will always be larger to changes in the prospect than to equal changes
in wealth.

Menezes and Hanson have also shown tha~ for an individual with

nonzero wealth and who is risk averse, the partial risk aversion coefficient
must be increasing with an increase in prospect size t.
The behavior of the relative risk aversion coefficient has long been
controversial.

Arrow has shown that for U(W) to be bounded from below and

above the relative risk aversion coefficient must be less than one at
low wealth levels and greater than one at high wealth levels.

If it

were monotonic in between, it would have to rise from below one to above

one.
One observation which would be difficult to reconcile with a stable
utility function in terms of final wealth states would be if we found
the relative risk aversion coefficient to drop very rapidly from high
levels as prospect size rises by fairly small amounts relative to wealth
(remember again that

¾

=

¾f) _.

This would indicate that the risk aversion

function would have to have a hump just below the current wealth level
and in a fairly small neighborhood around current weal th.

In other words,
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the utility function would indeed have much stronger curvature around zero
income(• current wealth) then away from it.

If this were true for most

individuals one would immediately ask how that strong curvature segment
ended up in the neighborhoo d of current wealth and be led to a specificatio n
of a utility fllllction in terms of current income or gains and losses.
In panels 4, 5 and 6 of Table 1 the approximate measures of partial,
absolute and relative risk aversion are given for the alternative s.

A

utility function with constant partial risk aversion was used to approximate
these measures (U • (1-S)~-s).

Each indifferenc e point between two alter

natives, say A and B, defines an equation EU(A) • EU(B) which can be used
to measure Sat that point.

A and B can then be computed once the game

levels and wealth levels are given.
endpoints

1

The indifferenc e points establish the

for the interval within which A, Sand R must lie for any of the

alternative s.

The geometric mean of the endpoints was assigned to the al

ternatives as the approximate measure for those individuals who chose it.
Partial risk aversion varies from values> 7.5 for extreme risk averters
to values of less than O for the risk-prefer rers.

For any given choice

alternative it is, of course, invariant to the scale of the game.
From Table 1 we see that, as the game level rises the risk aversion
distributio ns shift to the right.
aversion.

This implies increasing partial risk

At high game levels most individuals have partial risk aver

sion values in the neighborhoo d of pne.

At the 0.50 Rs level the value

of absolute risk aversion also centers around one, but it falls very
rapidly to values of around 0.0017 at the 500 Rs level with the possible
maximum around .01 at that game level.

Relative risk aversion, for an

individual with the approximate modal value of wealth of Rs 10000
1 The measures were evaluated for certain incomes of 0.7, 7, 70 and 700
Rs respectivel y which is roughly the certainty equivalent of the
alternative s at the various game levels.
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starts in the neighborh ood of 1000 to drop to roughly one or two at the
500 Rs level.
The extreme variation s of absolute and ~elative risk aversion across
game levels (and wealth levels for R) are caused by the fact that partial
risk aversion is fairly stable across such levels.

If S varies only between

zero and 5, then A and R must vary much more since they are related to S
as follows

A = S/M; R

Given the empirical finding of fair

stability of S, R is a particula rly difficult measure to compare across
individua ls since it depends both on Wand the game level.

And except for

wealth levels close to zero, the typical hAhavinr of our llR in~ivi.dua ls ~x~ibits
declining relative risk aversion:

A choice of Eat the 0.50 level implies

a relative risk aversion of 226 whereas a choice of Bat the 500 Rs level
implies a value of 1.71.

The individua ls, in making choices at the 0.50

Rs level are putting extremely small proportio ns of their wealth at risk,
yet still most of them are not risk-neut ral.

As the game rises to larger

proportio ns in terms of their wealth, they cannot, with these alternati ves,
move sufficien tly rapidly to less risky alternativ es to lead to increasin g
relative risk aversion.

Their behavior at low 2ame 1Pve1s i~

far too risk-aver se to be consisten t with Arrow's hypothesi s.
The more rigorous test of asset integratio n is whether the absolute
(and relative) risk aversion coefficie nts change at approxima tely the
same rate with changes in income as

with changes in wealth.

In the

regressio n analysis of absolute risk aversion 1 on personal characte ristics
(Binswang er 1978a) I found that wealth tends to have a slightly
nega•tive effect on risk aversion which, however, was not always statistic ally
significa nt.

It was also noted there that--at the 5 Rs level-a massive

change in wealth was required to make a risk-aver se person who chooses B to
behave in a nearly risk-neut ral fashion (Table 7 of Binswange r 1978).
1 The regressio ns were run on the natural
log of partial risk aversion.
But transform ing to the log of absolute risk aversion just changes the
intercept of these regressio ns.
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This contrasts with the sharp reduction in absolute risk aversion shown in
Table 1 of this paper.

Consider the shifts more carefully:

Geometric
Average
in A

A

Game No. 7, 5 Rs level

0.0662

-2.7149

Game No. 9, 50 Rs level

0.0101

-4.4986

u- - .0561

6tnA = -1.7837

Difference

The largest regression coefficient of in A on wealth measured at the
5 Rs level (and at the 50 Rs level) was

-0.00945.

Increasing it by twice

it standard error brings it to a maximum estimate b* = 0.0181.

The

increase in wealth required to induce the same change in absolute risk
aversion than

iW* =

the shift from the5 Rs to the 50 Rs game can be measured as

l000x 6in A/b* • Rs 98527

(This is roughly 47% of the largest wealth observed in the sample).

It compares

with an increase in the certainty equivalent of income of between 45 and 95

Rs for the shift between the 5 Rs and the 50 Rs game levels. 1

The derivatives of

absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth and income is clearly not of the sam1
magnitude:

even under the most favorable assumptions it takes an increase

in wealth of roughly 1000 time the change in certain income to lead to an
1 The minimum certainty equivalents
for an extreme risk averter is 5 Rs
for the 5-Rs-game and 50 Rs for the 5(}-Rs-game. For an ris~neutral individual
it is Rs 10 and 100. The smallest possible difference in Mis thus 45 Rs while
the largest one is 95 Rs.
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equally large change in absolute risk aversion.
One objection to this test is that the coefficie nt of wealth is
measured from the cross-sec tional variation of absolute risk aversion
across the bousebold ~while the differenc e caused by the change in game
level is simply the differenc e in the geometric average of absolute risk
aversion for the same individua ls across the game scale.

(Note that the

differenc e across game scale is significa nt statistic ally at the 10% level,
and also at the 1% level).
fortunate ly.

Little can be done about this objection , un

A second objection is that certain wealth is relativel y poorly

measured and therefore its regressio n coefficie nt is not as reliably estimated
than the differenc e of means across game scale. If Wis measured with random
error, its coefficie nt may be biased, but it is hard to imagine
systemati c errors in its measureme nt which could cause a bias of a factor
of 1000.

A third objection is that the utility function with constant

partial risk aversion leads to poor approxima tion of the absolute risk
aversion coefficie nts.

Since we observe increasin g partial risk aversion,

a function with those characte ristics should have been used.

Such a

function with increasin g partial risk aversion (IPRAF) will be discussed
below, but it has two parameter s and needs equations from two indiffere nt
points to be estimated .
not clear.

Which indiffere nce points should be chosen is

Absolute risk aversion for the IPRAF has been estimated for

all combinati ons of indifferen ce points which give a solution.

The values

found differ by less than 4% from those of the constant partial risk
aversion function in all cases which did not include the indifferen ce
point

between alternati ves O and A.

For the latter cases, absolute

risk aversion is underestim ated by between 10% and 20% with the CPRAF.
But this is not sufficien t to radically alter the regressio n results.
In addition the experimen tal results tend to indicate that,at such high
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risk aversion levels, partial risk aversion increases at a very slow rate.
The basic reason for rejecting asset integratio n (or stability over time of
a utility function in forms of wealth) is that the observed behavior of individua ls

at low game levels is extremely cautious relative to their assets.

Consider the

individua l choosing game Bat the 5 Rs level with low and high outcome of 4 and
12 Rs.

Alternati ve A on the other hand would give him 3 and 15 Rs.

He is

unwilling to risk a loss of Rs 1 with 50% probabili ty to increase his expected
income by Rs 1.

If.his net worth is at an average of 10000 Rs (close to the mode

in the sample) then the loss with 50% is only 1/l0000th of his wealth.

Choosing

the same alternati ve at the 500 Rs level implies a much higher risk relative to
wealth.

Stated otherwise , the curvature of the utility function is much larger

at low levels of games than at high levels.
The rejection of asset integratio n implies that an individua l's utility
function is not stable relative to all wealth positions which he could achieve,
but that it does adjust its "wiggles" to new wealth position when they are
reached.

It is a form of compartm entalizatio n of the mind which appears not

to integrate all uncertain income prospects to consider a single distribut ion
of final wealth states.

This opens the possibili ty that income prospects which

accrue in different form may be evaluated different ly depending on the form
in which the income accrues.

That, to some extent, limits our capacity to

extrapola te the experimen tal findings to other situation s.

In particula r,

since the game was played only with positive payoffs, we cannot infer the
sh~pe of the utility functions for losses, which we could have if asset
integratio n had been accepted.

As

it stands we have little informati on

about the shape of a utility curve for incomes below zero.
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On

the other hand, lack of asset integration should not severely

restrict the ability to derive comparative static results on what happens
to portfolio choice and other choices when wealth changes.

The experimental

results give estimates of partial risk aversion of different game levels
and indicate how it changes as wealth rises.

The numerical bounds on

partial risk aversion should in fact lead to sharper comparative static
predictions.
In empirical investigations it has always been difficult to work with
utility functions in the form of wealth, in part because it requires that one
measure certain wealth.

This may not be too difficult in portfolio analysis

problems where extremely well developed markets provide portfolio valuations
every day.

But for problems in agricultur~ imperfect land markets make

estimation of certain wealth very difficult and the same applies to invest
ment decisions in human capital.

Functional Forms for Utility Functions for Gains
This section explores what functional form for the utility function
could be consistent with the experimental evidence.

The power function

has constant partial risk aversion (constant relative risk acresion if
specified in terms of wealth) and it can be written as
U = (1 - S)M(l - S)
with S = partial risk aversion.

(18)
Such a function would fit fairly well for those

individua.ls who were choosing alternatives B or Cat low game levels and
continued to do so throughout the sequence.

The function has no upper

asymptote, and that seems to be necessary to get increasing partial risk
aversion.

The following function may be called increasing partial risk

aversion ftmction (IPRAF) and has an upper asymptote.

0 <

b < 1

0 <

M < ..,

(19)

The limiting

case for b • 1 is the negative exponential function

Um 1 - e-aM which has constant absolute risk aversion A~ a.

As

verified easily the IPRAF has UM> 0, UMM

Partial risk

<

0 and U.Mt-IM > 0.

can be

aversion is equal to
S =

ab}(' + 1 - b

(20)

For M • 0 partial risk aversion is (1-b), a value of less than one.

The

parameter b thus determines initial partial.risk aversion, while, for given
b, the parameter a determines how fast it will rise with income.

The

elasticity of partial risk aversion with respect to income is

(21)

i.e. it is zero for zero income and reaches a value of b asymptotically.

This is somewhat inconsistent with the experimental evidence where we find
that the proportionate increase in partial risk aversion is about the same
as we 100ve from one game level to the next for all game levels.
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Proportiona l increase in S

Geometric Average of

s
0.279

0.50 Rs level

+ 667.

5Rs level

0.4635

50 Rs level

.7046

+ 547.

1.0896

500 Rs level
But

+ 527.

this is based on averages, not on individual behavior, which

differs quite markedly.

Those whose low level choices were B or C have

very slowly rising partial risk aversion while it rises much faster for
those who were risk neutral initially.

And there appears to be a barrier

on risk aversion at the upper end.
One can use two
equat i ons

indifferenc e points at two game levels to define two

. h can b e so 1ve d fr a and b
o
.

For example, if an individual

w h ic

is indifferent between C and Eat the 5 Rs level, this defines an equation

=

e

-a

b
+ e

-al9

b

and the indifferenc e point between Band Cat
similar equation.

(22)
the 500 Rs level implies a

These equations cannot be solved analytically for a and b,

but one can iteratively approximate a solut1on.

Table 3 gives the solution

for all indifferenc e patterns between the 5 and 500 Rs levels for which
solution to the ~quation pair exist. 1

1

Utility functions so

estimated all imply

Solutions were also derived for indifferenc e points at the 5 Rs and 50 Rs
level and for indifferenc e points at the 50 and 500 Rs level respectivel y.
Howeve½ !n all these cases partial risk aversion rises far more rapidly then
implied in the experimenta l results. However, in the cases just mentioned
it becomes clear that the IPRAF puts constraints on how fast risk aversion
can increase. Since b < 1, the elasticity of S with respect to M cannot
exceed 1, which means, for example, that one cannot be indifferent between
C and Eat the 5 Rs level and A and Bat the 50 Rs level.
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Table 3

.

Examples of IPRAF and the Implied Choice Patterns
(l)a

(2)

(4)

(3)

(5)

(6)

(7)

.4095

COEFFICIENTS OF IPRAF
Coefficierc a

.9970

.7032

.7326

.8548

.3829

.6385

Coefficient b

.0004634

.007174

.01675

• 03961

.2417

.2008

1.282

CHOICE PATTERNS IMPLIED AT DIFFERENT LEVELS
(TWO LETTERS UNDERLINED MEANS INDIFFERENCE)
LEVEL
0.50 Rs

EF

E

E

E

C

C

B

5 Rs

EF

CE

CE

CE

BC

BC

AB

C

C

B

B

A

A

QA

AB

OA

OA

50 Rs

E

500 Rs

CE

5000 Rs

B

A

A

0

A

0

0

0

0

0

0

A

0

0

50000 Rs

BC

AB

PARTIAL RISK AVERSION AT DIFFERENT LEVELS
CERTAIN INCOME
0.7

.001

• 30

.28

.17

.70

.46

1.04

7

.004

• 32

• 32

• 32

.81

•81

1.75

70

.033

.40

•54

1.4

1.1

2.3

3.6

700

.321

.81

1. 76

9.3

1.76

8.8

8.3

7000

32

2.8

8.31

66

3.4

37

ain this case the payoffs of alternative F had to be changed from (0,20)
to (0.01, 20) to derive a solution.

20
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extre me or sever e risk avers ion (choi ces O or A)
at high payo ff leve ls, becau se the
reach this ceili ng value s (wher e marg inal utili ty
becomes zero) fairl y rapid ly.
We saw on page 51 that in the exper imen t parti
al risk avers ion rises by about
135% betwe en the 5 Rs and the 500 Rs level for the
avera ge of the samp le.
An appro xima tely equal rise is impli ed in funct
ions (2) and (5) of Table 3.
However it is an open ques tion how good the appro
xima tion is outsi de of
the range of the game payo ffs. Shou ld we reall y
belie ve that when offer ed
a game at the 50000 Rs leve l, almo st all indiv idual
s would choos e the
riskl ess alter nativ e zero?
The IPRAF thus has two limit ation s:

It is not defin ed for value s of

M less than zero and it may hit its ceili ng
value too rapid ly if parti al

risk avers ion incre ases rapid ly at low level s of
incom e and then less rapid ly.
For empi rical appli catio ns one may even tuall y have
to work with a utili ty
funct ion which has its nega tive segm ent, its low
income_seS!Illent and its
high incom e segm ent appro xima ted by diffe rent funct
ional
forms . As it stand s we have littl e infor matio n abou
t the nega tive segm ent
or the very high income segm ent anc must await more
expe rimen tal work.

SUMMING UP
Expe rimen tal metho ds have been large ly negle cted
in econo mics as a
mean s for testi ng hypo these s abou t pred ictiv e power
of vario us mode ls.
Psyc holog ists have used them exten sivel y, but usua
lly with very small
payo ffs to the indiv idual s invol ved and/o r with
very small samp le sizes .
Yet in this exper imen t it becom es clear that behav
ior with trivi al payo ffs
is not at all the same as .. beha vior at subs tanti
al payo ffs, where behav ior
appe ars more pred ictab le and regu lar. The direc
t costs of the exper imen t

54

reported here was roughly $2500 in prize money and an equal amount in
research assistance, travel and computer costs. 1

If the study had been

carried out in the U.S. with payoffs roughly equal to unskilled wage rates,
the direct experimenta l cost would probably have been
and possibly $50,000 for research assistance.

$150,000 for prizes

While this is much more

expensive, many research projects have budgets which far exceed this amotmt.
For the households studied the experiment allows us to conclude
that, at substantial payoffs, almost all individuals are risk averse, but
that very few are severely or extremely risk averse.

In fact, risk aversion

differs far less across individuals than one would have expected.

Furthermore ,

partial risk aversion is clearly rising.
The experimenta l results are inconsisten t with all but one of
the security based models of behavior, the safety fixed model with income
integration .

But this model is not rejected only because it is unable to

predict how rich or poor people should behave when confronted with a set
of uncertain prospects as the one of the experiment.
In particular the results are inconsisten t with all models which
assume that behavior is strongly influenced by a goal of reaching a fixed
subsistence income.

If the behavioral importance of a subsistence goal

cannot be shown to be important for the households studied, which belong
to the poorest of the world, it is hard to imagine where subsistence based
models could be important.
On the other hand, the results are not inconsisten t with some of
the utility maximizing models.

Among the latter models, only those which

employ a linear utility ftmction can be rejected.
1 salary costs of

my

assignment in India have not been counted.
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Yet we do find evidence £or something like bounded rationality.
Individuals do not seem to base their decisions over new income opportunities
on the basis of final wealth states evaluated with a time-stable utility
function over such states.

Such a utility function would imply a global

rationality since it would evaluate all incomes, regardless of their. form,
in the same way and enable present decisions to be fully consistent with
past decisions and future decisions.

Instead, what we observe is a utility

function which appears to adjust to new wealth positions and has richer
people behave in much the same way as poorer ones as soon as trivial game
levels are exceeded.

Unfortunately, this finding implies that a game

with gains only is inadequate to measure the loss branch of a utility
function.

New experiments will be needed to do that.

Another problem

which needs new experimental evidence is the issue of probability prefer
ences or, more generally, of the formation of subjective probabilities.
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